The following cases were recently reported by the Hon Mr Justice Bokhary. See below for His Lordship’s remarks and observations by way of Editor’s Notes.

YWS v SJ (Ancillary Relief: Variation of Maintenance) [2025] 2 HKLRD 921

“This judgment illustrates the application of the principles and practice relating to the courts’ power to vary or discharge financial provision orders.”

Lee Keng Wai v Town Planning Appeal Board [2025] 2 HKLRD 947

“The gist of the judgment may be stated as follows. None of the other arguments relied upon by the applicants take their case any further than their argument on irrationality. On that argument, they succeeded: they having, for the detailed reasons given by the Court, overcome the high hurdle of showing that no authority acting reasonably could have refused the planning permissions that they sought. Essentially, the Court’s acceptance of the applicant’s contention that the impugned decision was irrational is based on the nine underlying matters addressed in the third of the above holdings. Additionally, however, attention is drawn to the discussion at paras.64–67 of the judgment of other matters relevant to the issue of irrationality.”
 

Lo Kwok Kit Sam v Leung Kwok Hung (No 2) [2025] 2 HKLRD 1087

“(1) There are many reported cases on intermediate appeal and even on final appeal dealing with fact-finding. In the present case, we are able to see a first instance judge setting out, and actually applying, the principles upon which he arrived at his findings of fact. That is one reason for reporting a case decided on the facts. There are other such reasons. 

(2) The pleading point in the present case was not a technical one readily met by an amendment to be allowed with an appropriate order as to costs and perhaps an adjournment. In the present case, the pleading point was directed to the stance maintained to the end on a pivotal issue. The present case is an illustration of one of the situations in which such a pleading point will usually be decisive against the party whom it is taken against, as it was in the present case.

(3) In treating a witness’ telling of untruths on some collateral matters as a basis on which to reject his testimony on the crucial issue, the Judge, it will be observed, explained in appropriate detail why he disbelieved the witness on those collateral matters. While a judge generally need not labour the facts on collateral matters, a certain amount of detail is appropriate when what a witness says on collateral matters is used as a basis for treating him as having been untruthful on the crucial issue — especially when, as in the present case, the witness is the losing party.”
 

BGA Holdings Ltd, Re [2025] 2 HKLRD 1113

“If, exceptionally, a judge’s evaluation of evidence and findings are all too obviously wrong, and the arguments advanced before the judge against the making of such evaluation and findings are all too obviously right, then the arguments advanced on appeal against such evaluation and findings may differ little from those advanced in the court below. But given a first instance judge’s advantage of receiving the evidence at first-hand, showing on appeal that a judge’s evaluation of evidence and findings are plainly wrong normally requires considerably more than that, and then what the Court of Appeal characterised as “regurgitating unsuccessful arguments made below” would not be nearly enough. Moreover, a challenge on appeal against a judge’s evaluation of evidence and findings may (as in the present case) be regarded by the appellate court as so lacking in merit as to warrant a special order as to costs. In the present case, the dismissal of the appeal was with: (i) indemnity costs; and (ii) an order that the appellant and its solicitors disclose the name(s) and address(es) of any instigator(s) or funder(s) of these appeals. That is not to pre-judge anything against any such person. They would have a full and fair opportunity to be heard.”